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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
LEGITIMATION - INHERITANCE
Following the general rule, Howells v. Limbeck7 holds that whether
the act of the father in acknowledging a child as his own has the effect
of legitimating the child depends upon the law of the domicile of the
father at the time of the performance of the act.' The case is also au-
thority for the proposition that the child thus legitimated is placed in the
same situation with regard to inheritance of Ohio land as though he had
acquired the status of legitimacy in Ohio.9
FLETCHER R. ANDREWs
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The variety of constitutional issues last year appears to be greater
than usual.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
The supreme court reaffirmed once again the rule that a constitutional
question will not be decided until the necessity for such decision arises
on the record before the court.' The decision arose in an action to enjoin
municipal officers from acting favorably on an annexation to a munici-
pality for municipal purposes. The constitutional issue - whether un-
voted mandated tax levies imposed by overlapping school districts would
exceed the constitutional ten-mill limitation - was avoided on the ground
that the question before the court was the validity of the annexation peti-
tion rather than the constitutional question.
Two cases involved the inherent power of the judiciary to punish
acts of contempt. In State v. Local 5760 USW 2 the supreme court
held that this inherent power could not be limited by the legislative au-
thority. Union officials who refused during a strike to make reasonable
efforts to prevent interference by the union with court processes could be
7. 172 Ohio St. 297, 175 N.E.2d 517 (1961). See also discussion in Domestic Relations
section, p. 466 infra.
8. For statement and discussion of the general rule, see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 141 (3d ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 179 (1959); STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWs 332 (2d ed. 1951); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 140 (1934); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
9. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142-43 (3d ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 179 (1959); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 335, 411 (2d ed. 1951). The
court also based its decision on the point that full faith and credit was properly accorded
to the Florida decree holding that the son was the only heir of his father and entitled to the
father's estate, wherever situated. On this point Judge Taft disagreed on the ground that
the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over the parties.
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subjected to contempt charges. One dissenting judge had reasonable
doubt as to whether the necessary intent for what appeared to be a
criminal contempt action was present and believed that the contempt con-
viction should not be upheld. In the other case,' an attorney who advised
his client to violate a court order, on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction, was also subject to this contempt authority. The judicial
hearing which involved the contempt charge was acrimonious but the
supreme court, deploring this lack of restraint and decorum, refused to
upset the conviction. Two judges dissented on the ground that the at-
torney involved, on opposing counsel's suggestion and with full knowl-
edge of the court, agreed to submit to the contempt charge only as a
means of testing the jurisdictional issue. This conviction, therefore,
carried the contempt processes to an unwarranted end.
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The important restriction on the General Assembly over appointive
offices provided in article II, section 27 of the Ohio Constitution was
considered in 1961. Ohio Revised Code section 3769.02 created a state
racing commission of five members appointed by the governor "with the
advice and consent of the Senate." This legislation was held to be un-
constitutional on the ground that it was an encroachment on the executive
power of appointment.4 Under article II, section 27 "no appointing
power shall be exercised by the General Assembly except as prescribed in
the constitution." In other words the general assembly has no authority
over appointments unless the constitution specifically so provides. As a
result of this decision, in the 1961 state general elections, a new provision
to the Ohio Constitution, article III, section 21, was adopted: "When re-
quired by law appointments to state office shall be subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate." Detailed procedures for advice and consent
were included in this new constitutional section.
The controversial economic issue of fair trade restrictions on retail
merchants presented another aspect of a legislative authority issue last
year. In one common pleas case5 the 1959 Fair Trade Act was held un-
constitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power to private
persons. Private manufacturers were given authority to fix minimum
resale prices. A few months later the same act was held valid in an
1. Bennett v. Diefenbach, 172 Ohio St. 185, 174 N.E.2d 259 (1961).
2. 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961). See also discussion in Labor Law section, p.
500 infra.
3. Petition for Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 175 N.B.2d 59 (1961).
4. State ex rel. Burns v. DiSalle, 172 Ohio St. 363, 176 N.E.2d 428 (1961).
5. Bulova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store, 176 N.E.2d 527 (Ohio C.P. 1961). See also discus-
sion in Trade Regulation section, p. 537 infra.
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appellate court.6 Obviously, a supreme court determination is needed to
settle the knotty legal issues involved in this current merchandising con-
troversy in modern society.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection in constitutional law revolves around the reasonable
classification which the legislature determines when utilizing state police
power to regulate public health, safety, morals, and welfare. No more
difficult issues have arisen than those involved in the Sunday dosing laws.
Specific exemptions have in practical operation caused one business to be
closed on Sunday, while an economic competitor is permitted to remain
open. An appellate court upheld the Sunday dosing act as valid with
its present classification of exemptions,7 while one county court reached
the opposite conclusion.8
In a more traditional equal protection case, a sovereign police power
regulation was held valid as a reasonable classification: a municipal
ordinance prohibited parking on the street near the city hall except for
municipally owned vehicles.'
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
By Due Process
Revoking a motor vehicle dealer's license for non-compliance with
the statute requiring that makes of new automobiles which the dealer in-
tended to sell be listed in the application for a dealer's license was not an
unconstitutional deprivation of property.' ° Similarly, no deprivation oc-
curred under the statute authorizing the Tax Commissioner to assess the
highway use tax and penalties on such tax when the taxpayer failed to file
a return or filed an incomplete or incorrect return." However, the statute
prohibiting shipment of more than ten percent by weight of undersized
fish and requiring all fish brought into Ohio to be subject to the laws of
Ohio was held to be unconstitutional.' 2
6. Hudson Distributor's Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 176 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). See
also discussion in Trade Regulation section, p. 537 infra.
7. State v. Corn, 113 Ohio App. 50, 177 N.E.2d 289 (1960).
8. State v. Woodville Appliance Inc., 171 N.E.2d 565 (Lucas County Ct., Ohio 1960).
9. City of Akron v. Davies, 111 Ohio App. 103, 170 N.E.2d 494 (1959).
10. Ron Best Motors, Inc. v. Ohio Motor Vehicles Dealers' and Salesmen's Licensing Bd.,
113 Ohio App. 195, 177 N.E.2d 625 (1960). See also discussion in Administrative Law
and Procedure section, p. 432 supra.
11. Key v. Bowers, 112 Ohio App. 546, 171 N.E.2d 913 (1960).
12. State v. Kosloff Fisheries Inc., 174 N.E.2d 640 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
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By Eminent Domain
An action to recover compensation for property taken by the Director
of the State Highway Department must be brought in Franklin County
under Ohio Revised Code section 5501.18. Suits against the state must
be brought in the manner prescribed by law under Ohio Constitution
article I, section 16, which is not a self-executing constitutional provision
and which does not of itself authorize actions against the state. Thus
the property owner must bring suit in Franklin County.'
By Zoning
As usual, zoning matters presented the greatest number of constitu-
tional issues last year. An allotment plat which had been approved and
recorded was held not to fix irrevocably the rights of the parties. Zoning
requirements were changed thereafter and the lot frontage of 150 feet
was enforced instead of the 100 feet frontage as recorded in the plat.'4
However, where owners were constructing a truck terminal and a zoning
ordinance was then enacted limiting such terminals to certain specified
streets, no retroactive application was permitted which would otherwise
result in an unconstitutional deprivation of property. 5 It was also held
that for the purpose of asserting deprivation of property by an invalid
zoning action, one must be the owner of the property involved.'
Two trial courts reported zoning judgments in 1961. An ordinance
precluding public garages, garage repair shops, or filling stations within
a radius of 100 feet of public schools, playgrounds, libraries, churches, and
hospitals was invalid as to filling stations. No reasonable relationship to
health, safety or general welfare existed.' Another city was denied
authority to zone beyond its boundaries. A zoning map which originally
extended beyond the corporate limits was still inapplicable after the area
beyond the limits was annexed. 8
FREE SPEECH AND PRESS
"The Lovers," a motion picture, was held to be obscene in 1961 and
not protected by the free speech and press provisions of the Constitution.
Under Ohio Revised Code section 2905.34 the party who knowingly
possessed and knowingly exhibited the picture was constitutionally con-
13. Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 303, 175 N.E.2d 725 (1961).
14. State ex rel. Mar-Well, Inc. v. Dodge, 113 Ohio App. 118, 177 N.E.2d 515 (1960).
See also discussion in Municipal Law section, p. 505 infra.
15. State ex rel. Smlbarg v. Leighton, 173 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
16. Western Indus. Inc. v. Hamilton County, Bd. of County Comm'rs, 173 N.E.2d 143
(Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Administrative Law and Procedure section,
p. 432 supra.
17. Patton v. City of Springfield, 170 N.E.2d 873 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
18. State v. Contini, 176 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
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victed of a felony'" on the basis of the Roth2" test, discussed in a prior
survey article."'
In another case22 involving the same movie, the defendant was con-
victed of a misdemeanor under a different statute, Ohio Revised Code
section 2905.342, for having possessed an obscene motion picture. The
Ohio Supreme Court found this statute unconstitutional for no provision
was made in it with regard to knowledge or scienter on the part of the
defendant. A Cincinnati ordinance relating to possession of obscene
material was also held unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court be-
cause it did not include the requirement of scienter or knowledge.' A
magazine and book distributor's conviction was therefore reversed.
The ghost of movie censorship emerged in another decision. A
motion picture company sought to recover from former state officials
the fees paid under a movie censorship statute later held unconstitutional.
The court denied recovery for no personal liability attached to the in-
dividual officials.24
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
Ohio law requires that an indigent defendant convicted of a felony be
furnished a complete transcript of the record of the trial at public expense.
It is not unconstitutional, however, to deny him the possession of the
original records of the proceedings or the furnishing of such records at
public expense.25
Two search and seizure decisions were forthcoming last year also. A
defendant who voluntarily invited police officers without a warrant to
enter waives his constitutional right, even though he asked the officers
if they had a warrant after unlocking a closet containing the goods which
were seized. " Furthermore, once voluntary consent to search is given, it
cannot be countermanded during the search.
The statute authorizing the Tax Commissioner to require any person
to produce books and records is valid on its face. A subpoena issued
19. State v. Jacobellis, 175 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), aff'd, 173 Ohio St. 15, 179
N.E.2d 777 (1962). See also discussion Criminal Law section p. 464 infra.
20. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21. Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Constitutional Law, 10 WEST. RES. L. REV. 359
(1959); Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Constitutional Law, 11 WEsT. RES. L. REV. 356
(1960).
22. State v. Warth, 173 Ohio St. 15, 179 N.E.2d 772 (1962). See also discussion in
Criminal Law section, p. 464 infra.
23. City of Cincinnati v. Marshall, 172 Ohio St. 280, 175 N.E.2d 178 (1961).
24. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Tracy, 176 N.E.2d 610 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
25. State ex rel. Lancaster v. State, 111 Ohio App. 59, 170 N.E.2d 749 (1960).
26. State v. Lett, 178 N.E.2d 96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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